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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the determinants of small corporate taxpayers’ tax non-compliance 
in Nigeria. This study develops a model of small corporate taxpayers’ non-compliance, 
which is underpinned by the theories of deterrence and social exchange. The model contains 
both economic (audit, complexity, penalty and tax compliance costs) and non-economic 
(bribery, fairness perception, public goods supply, perception of the tax tribunal and tax rate 
perception) determinants of tax non-compliance. This study extends the current literature by 
investigating the direct effect of perception of the tax tribunal and incorporating the 
mediating effect of tax compliance costs. The study administered questionnaires to a sample 
of 450 small corporate taxpayers operating in Kano state of Nigeria. PLS-SEM was used to 
test the hypotheses. This study found that audit, complexity, fairness perception, perception 
of the tax tribunal, tax compliance costs and tax rate perception have significant direct 
effects on tax non-compliance. Tax compliance costs are found to mediate the influence of 
audit, complexity, perception of the tax tribunal and tax rate perception on tax non-
compliance. The findings of this study provide important insights to the tax authority, 
policy-makers and future researchers in understanding the tax non-compliance of small 
corporate taxpayers. To curtail tax non-compliance in Nigeria, the tax authority should 
widen its audit net and make the information about detecting tax evaders public to serve as a 
warning to potential evaders. The tax system should be fully automated to reduce the 
complexity and high compliance costs borne by the taxpayers. The tax authority should 
make the procedures of the tax tribunal available to the public through the mass media to 
increase positive perceptions about the tribunal and reduce non-compliance accordingly. 
The current tax rate structure should be made fairer by giving a lower rate to small 
corporate taxpayers to eliminate the perception of unfair tax burden.  
Keywords: corporate taxpayers, perception of tax tribunal, tax non-compliance, tax 
compliance costs, Nigeria  
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ABSTRAK 
Kajian ini menyelidik faktor penentu gelagat ketidakpatuhan cukai dalam kalangan 
pembayar cukai korporat kecil di Nigeria. Berdasarkan ulasan literatur, kajian ini 
membangunkan model gelagat ketidakpatuhan pembayar cukai korporat kecil yang 
didokong oleh teori pencegahan dan teori pertukaran sosial. Model ini terdiri daripada 
faktor ekonomi (audit, kompleksiti, penalti dan kos pematuhan cukai) dan faktor bukan 
ekonomi (kompleksiti, perkhidmatan awam, persepsi kadar cukai, persepsi keadilan, rasuah, 
dan persepsi peranan tribunal cukai). Kajian ini memperluaskan lagi literatur semasa dengan 
menyiasat kesan langsung peranan tribunal cukai dan kesan gabungan pengantara kos 
pematuhan cukai. Borang soal selidik telah diedarkan kepada 450 orang pembayar cukai 
korporat kecil yang beroperasi di Kano, Nigeria. Pendekatan PLS-SEM digunakan untuk 
menganalisa hipotesis kajian. Hasilnya, kajian ini mendapati bahawa audit, kompleksiti, 
persepsi keadilan, persepsi peranan tribunal cukai, kos pematuhan cukai dan persepsi kadar 
cukai mempunyai kesan langsung yang ketara ke atas gelagat ketidakpatuhan cukai. 
Sementara itu, kos pematuhan didapati menjadi pengantara bagi audit persepsi peranan 
tribunal cukai dan persepsi kadar cukai ke atas gelagat ketidakpatuhan cukai. Hasil kajian 
ini memberikan maklumat penting kepada pihak berkuasa cukai, pembuat dasar dan bagi 
kajian masa depan dalam memahami tingkah laku ketidakpatuhan pembayar cukai korporat. 
Dalam usaha untuk mengekang ketidakpatuhan cukai di Nigeria, pihak berkuasa cukai perlu 
meluaskan skop audit dan menyebarluaskan maklumat mengenai pengelak cukai yang telah 
dikesan, sebagai amaran kepada pengelak cukai yang berpotensi. Sistem cukai perlu 
diautomasikan sepenuhnya untuk mengurangkan kompleksiti dan kos pematuhan yang 
tinggi yang ditanggung oleh pembayar cukai. Di samping itu, sistem cukai hendaklah dibuat 
secara lebih mudah supaya proses pematuhan dapat ditingkatkan dan persepsi ketidakadilan 
dalam kalangan syarikat kecil dapat dihapuskan. Pihak berkuasa cukai perlu 
menyebarluaskan prosedur cukai tribunal awam melalui media massa untuk meningkatkan 
persepsi positif mengenai tribunal dan mengurangkan gelagat ketidakpatuhan. 
Kata kunci:   pembayar cukai korporat, tribunal cukai, gelagat ketidakpatuhan cukai dan 
kos pematuhan cukai, Nigeria 
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1 
CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Ensuring a stable flow of revenue is necessary for the proper functioning of every 
government, be it one in a developed or a developing nation. Taxation is one of the primary 
sources of income for governments and has been among the oldest and most sustainable 
sources of revenue for financing development plans. In this respect, Ndiaye and Korsu 
(2014) recommended a minimum tax revenue to Gross Domestic Products (GDP) ratio of 
20% for West African States (ECOWAS) like Nigeria. The Tax to GDP ratio is tax 
collected compared to the GDP and thus, an indicator of tax performance (EPS PEAKS, 
2013). 
Table 1.1 shows the tax performance of Nigeria using tax to GDP ratios for Nigeria 
compared to some other relevant countries. In the case of Nigeria, the ratio is very low and 
has declined from 5.11% in 2009, to 2.27% in 2010, to 1.80% in 2011, to 1.56% in 2012 
and 1.48 in 2013.  Atuanya and Augie (2014) emphasized that the ratio compared to those 
of some African countries of similar economic size as Nigeria, is one of the lowest. In fact, 
the tax revenue to GDP ratio of Nigeria is far below the recommended 20% for ECOWAS 
member countries.  
Table 1.1 
Tax Performance Comparison Based on Tax to GDP Ratios 
Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average (2009-2013) 
Australia 25.39 25.39 25.55 26.05 26.53 25.78 
Kenya 15.55 15.73 15.95 15.88 15.48 15.72 
Nigeria 5.11 2.27 1.80 1.56 1.48 2.44 
South Africa 24.40 25.04 25.18 25.59 26.05 25.25 
UK 24.34 25.45 26.07 25.35 25.31 25.30 
Source: Extracted from World Bank Indicators, 2017 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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Dear Valued Respondent, 
A SURVEY OF CORPORATE TAXPAYERS PERCEPTIONS AND TAX 
COMPLIANCE COSTS 
This is a survey of a doctoral research on company income tax and estimation of 
compliance costs. 
The researcher appreciates your kind assistance by taking your valuable time to 
complete the survey questionnaire, which is in English language. The researcher 
does recognize that your time is precious, and many demands are made upon it by 
your daily workload. Your participation in this survey would provide valuable input 
for the success of this research. 
All completed questionnaires will be the property of the researcher, which is 
considered as privilege and will be treated with strict confidentiality. Thus, the 
completed questionnaires will only be used for academic purpose.  
Should you have any queries or if you are interested in the outcomes of this research 
kindly contact the researcher. 
Yours sincerely, 
Musa Sulaiman Umar 
Ph.D. Student in Accounting 
School of Accounting 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
06010 Sintok, Kedah, Malaysia 
Phone no: 08063143811/+6014321836 
Email: s95505@uum.student.edu.my 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
Kindly tick an appropriate option based on the level of your agreement or 
disagreement with the provided statements based on the following scale:  
 
[1] = Strongly disagree 
[2] = Disagree 
[3] = Neutral 
[4] = Agree  
[5] = Strongly agree 
 
Where options are not based on the above scale, please provide the required 
information as accurate as possible. 
 
PART A: PERCEPTIONS AND OPINIONS  
 
Audit 
The following statements are about the possibility of the audit to take place and to 
detect any discrepancy. Please indicate your level of agreement with the statements by 
ticking one option under each statement.  
Statement 
Strongly disagree                Strongly agree                                                                              
 [1]             [2]           [3]         [4]           [5] 
1. The chances of being audited are 
high that it is not advisable trying to 
cut down a little on corporate income 
taxes for various reasons. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. There are chances that any 
discrepancy in the tax return will be 
detected. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. It is likely that an annual tax return 
with a discrepancy will be audited.  
1 2 3 4 5 
4. If a company is chosen for audit, it 
is likely that the audit will identify 
any discrepancy. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Bribery 
The following statements are about giving bribe to government officials to get things 
done. Please indicate your level of agreement with the statements by ticking one 
option under each statement. 
Statement 
Strongly disagree             Strongly agree                                                        
[1]           [2]         [3]             [4]           [5]   
1. It is common for small 
company to pay some irregular 
additional payments to get things 
done. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. A small company need to make 
extra unofficial payments to 
public officials to get connected 
to public services. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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3. A small company need to make 
extra unofficial payments to 
public officials to deal with taxes 
and tax collection. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. A small company need to make 
extra unofficial payments to 
public officials when dealing with 
customs/imports. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Complexity  
The following statements are about difficulties in filling the tax return and 
understanding the tax laws. Please indicate your level of agreement with the 
statements by ticking one option under each statement. 
Statement 
Strongly disagree             Strongly agree                                                                                 
[1]           [2]            [3]             [4]            [5] 
1. I consider corporate income tax 
return preparation simple. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Complexity in the income tax 
law is necessary so that companies 
are treated fairly. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Corporate income tax is not so 
complicated that you need the 
services of tax professionals to take 
advantage of most legal ways to 
save much taxes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Fairness Perception 
The following statements are about how fair is the tax law in relation to the current 
tax system that shifts more responsibilities to the taxpayers. Please show your level 
of agreement with the statements by ticking one option under each statement. 
Statement 
Strongly disagree            Strongly agree                                                                   
[1]               [2]            [3]            [4]           [5] 
1. The officers of every 
company have a moral 
obligation to report all their 
company’s income and pay the 
correct amount of corporate 
income tax. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Under the current income tax 
system corporate tax laws are 
fair.  
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Change to SAS did not make 
corporate income tax more on 
small companies. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Income Tax Non-Compliance 
The following statements are about reporting incomes and expenses of a company. 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the statements by ticking one option 
under each statement.   
Statement 
Strongly disagree         Strongly agree                                                    
 [1]          [2]         [3]         [4]          [5] 
1. It is not okay to under-report 
certain income since it does not 
really hurt anyone.  
1 2 3 4 5 
2. It is not okay to hide some 
earnings from interest or 
investment that the tax authority 
may not be able to find out about. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.  It does not make sense to take a 
chance and take a deduction when 
a company is not sure whether or 
not deserving the deduction. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. It is not normal to stretch some 
deductions to include some 
expenses that are not really such 
deductions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Penalty 
The following statements are about the certainty and severity of tax sanction and its 
impact on the taxpayers. Please indicate your level of agreement with the statements 
by ticking one option under each statement. 
Statement 
Strongly disagree              Strongly agree                                                            
[1]             [2]           [3]           [4]            [5] 
1. If an illegal discrepancy is 
detected in a company’s return; 
taking the company to court and 
paying the tax owe with interest 
and substantial fine will cause 
problem to the company. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. If an illegal discrepancy is 
detected in a company’s return; 
taking the company to the court, 
paying the tax owe with interest 
will cause problem to the company. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. If an illegal discrepancy is 
detected in a company’s return; 
paying the tax owe with interest 
and substantial fine will cause 
problem to the company. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. If an illegal discrepancy is 
detected in a company’s tax return; 
paying the tax owe with interest 
will cause problem to the company. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Public Goods Supply 
The following statements are about provision of public goods by the government. 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the statements by ticking one option 
under each statement. 
Statement 
Strongly disagree                Strongly agree                                                                              
[1]          [2]           [3]            [4]          [5] 
1. Public service in Nigeria is not 
vulnerable to political 
interference. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. The way the government is 
handling the health service is 
satisfactory.                            
1 2 3 4 5 
3. The way the government is 
handling the education system is 
satisfactory.                                          
1 2 3 4 5 
4. The general quality of 
infrastructure in Nigerian is 
satisfactory. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Perception of Tax Tribunal 
The following statements are about the procedures of tax appeal tribunal in judging 
tax disputes. Please indicate your level of agreement with the statements by ticking 
one option under each statement. 
Statement 
Strongly disagree              Strongly agree                                                                                
[1]              [2]           [3]            [4]              
[5]  
1. Corporate taxpayers can express 
their views and feelings during the 
tribunal procedures. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. The tribunal procedures are free 
of bias. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. The tribunal procedures are 
based on accurate information. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. The tribunal procedures upheld 
ethical and moral standards. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tax Rate Fairness 
The following statements are about the justice of the tax rate in relation to company 
size and profit performance. Please indicate your level of agreement with the 
statements by ticking one option under each statement. 
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Statement 
Strongly disagree            Strongly agree                                                                           
    [1]           [2]         [3]          [4]          [5] 
1. A fair tax rate should be the same 
for every company regardless of size 
(small, medium or large). 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. It is fair that high-profit companies 
should pay a higher rate of tax than 
small and medium companies. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. It is fair that high-profit companies 
should pay a higher rate of tax than 
low-profit companies. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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PART B: ESTIMATION OF TAX COMPLIANCE COSTS 
Section 1: Internal Tax Compliance Cost  
10. Please estimate the time spent and wage proportion (per month) by the staff 
working on income tax activities (excluding usual bookkeeping and overhead cost) 
in your company for 2014. Please write ‘0’ if you do not incur these costs.  
 
Total hours/month 
 
Wage proportion 
₦/month 
 
Manager/ Accountant       [                ]             [                  ] 
Account Clerk       [                ]             [                  ] 
Admin Staff       [                ]             [                  ] 
Other Staff       [                ]             [                  ] 
 
11. Did your company incur any other additional non-staff costs for income tax 
compliance in 2014? Please provide or estimate the amount spent. (Please write ‘0’ 
if you do not incur these costs in your company). 
 
Naira/month 
₦ 
       Stationery [                   ] 
       Postage [                   ] 
      Transportation [                   ] 
      Computer & Software [                   ] 
       Others, please specify: ............................................................[                   ] 
 
Section 2. External cost 
12. If your company employed external tax professionals to handle Company 
Income Tax in 2014, please provide or estimate the cost paid to an external tax 
professional for Company Income Tax in 2014. [Please write ‘0’ if you did not incur 
these costs (in 2014) in your company]:  
 Naira/year 
₦ 
Accountant    [                   ] 
Lawyer   [                   ] 
Others, please specify 
..................................................... 
  [                   ] 
13. If your company claims costs from the government for the time and money spent 
(for internal or external tax compliance cost) by the company in dealing with 
Company Income Tax in 2014, how much do you think is a fair compensation? 
(Please write ‘0’ if you did not incur these costs in your company):  
                             Amount  
₦ 
Internal cost [              ] 
External cost [              ] 
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14. Compared with other business in your industry, the estimated level of Company 
Income Tax compliance costs is.  
 
Very High    High Normal   Low Very low 
[           ] [           ] [           ] [           ] [           ] 
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PART C: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
15. How long have your company been in business: 
 
Less than 3 years          3 to 5           6 to 8     More than 8  
     [          ]                              [          ]                              [      ]                              [   ]                              
     
16. Please indicate the main business activity of your company in 2014: 
Manufacturing                                                                         [        ] 
Agriculture                                                                              [        ] 
Transportation                                                                         [        ] 
Hotels and restaurants                                                             [        ]  
Culture and tourism                                                                 [        ] 
Trade and commerce                                                               [        ] 
ICT                                                                                          [        ] 
Building and construction                                                       [        ] 
Others, please specify.......................................                      [        ]  
 
17. How do you keep your accounting system?  
Manual system                             [        ] 
Computerized                   [        ] 
Mixed (computer & Manual)                 [        ] 
Other, please specify .............................................................[        ] 
 
18. Please indicate the number of staff in your company in 2014. 
Less than 50      [        ] 
50 to 99       [        ] 
100 to 149      [        ] 
150 to 199      [        ] 
200 and above      [        ] 
 
19. What is your current position in the company 
Chief 
Executive 
Officer 
Managing 
director 
Manager/Accountan
t  
Others, 
please specify  
      [       ]       [       ]       [       ]       [       ] 
 
20. Make any comment either on company income tax or compliance costs: 
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................. 
Thank you very much for taking your time to answer this questionnaire 
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Original Measures of Bribery from Martin et al (2001) 
1. It is common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular 
“additional payments” to get things done. 
2. Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to public 
officials to get connected to public services 
3. Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to public 
officials. to get licenses and permits  
4. Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to public 
officials. to deal with taxes and tax collection 
5. Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to public 
officials. to gain government contracts  
6. Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to public 
officials when dealing with customs/imports 
Note: items deleted are shaded 
 
Original Measures of Complexity from Christensen, Weihrich and Gerbing (1994) 
And Abdul Jabbar (2009) 
1. Personally I consider corporate Income Tax return preparations difficult. 
2. Corporate Income Tax law is relatively simple. 
3. Complexity in the Income Tax law is necessary so that companies are treated 
fairly. 
4. Corporate Income Tax is so complicated that only people who can afford to pay 
tax professionals can take advantage of most legal ways to save much taxes.  
Note: items deleted are shaded 
 
Original Measures of Fairness from Abdul Jabbar (2009) and Robert (1994) 
1. I believe that each company’s officers have a moral obligation to report all of their 
company’s income and pay the correct amount of Corporate Income Tax. 
2. Do you believe that the move to self-assessment system made the corporate tax 
laws more or less fair?  
3. Overall, has the move to self-assessment system made the distribution of the 
Corporate Income Tax burden among small, medium and large companies more or 
less fair?  
4. Do you believe that as result of changes in the Corporate Income Tax during the 
past five years SME companies are paying more or less taxes? 
5. Do you believe that as result of changes in the Corporate Income Tax during the 
past five years large companies are paying more or less taxes? 
Note: items deleted are shaded 
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Original Measures of Perception of Tax Tribunal from Colquitt (2001) 
1. Have you been able to express your views and feelings during those procedures?  
2. Have you had influence over the (outcome) arrived at by those procedures?  
3. Have those procedures been applied consistently?  
4. Have those procedures been free of bias?  
5. Have those procedures been based on accurate information?  
6. Have you been able to appeal the (outcome) arrived at by those procedures? 
7. Have those procedures upheld ethical and moral standards? 
Note: items deleted are shaded 
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Missing Values  
 
TRP1 TRP2 TRP3 AUD1 AUD2 AUD3 AUD4 PEN1 PEN2 PEN3 PEN4 CPX1 CPX2 CPX3 FRN1 FRN2 FRN3 
N Valid 300 300 300 298 300 299 300 298 298 300 300 299 298 298 300 300 300 
Missing 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 2 2 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 
BRB1 BRB2 BRB3 BRB4 RTT1 RTT2 RTT3 RTT4 PGS1 PGS2 PGS3 PGS4 TCC TNC1 TNC2 TNC3 TNC4 
298 298 298 299 299 300 299 299 300 300 300 298 300 300 300 300 300 
2 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
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PLS Quality Criteria Overview 
  AVE 
Composite 
Reliability 
R 
Square 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Communality Redundancy 
AUD 0.527 0.767   0.752 0.527   
BRB 0.519 0.810   0.748 0.519   
CPX 0.555 0.788   0.729 0.555   
FRN 0.633 0.838   0.730 0.633   
PEN 0.550 0.783   0.709 0.550   
PGS 0.527 0.763   0.706 0.527   
RTT 0.523 0.766   0.828 0.523   
TNC 0.682 0.896 0.480 0.843 0.682 0.136 
TRP 0.603 0.818   0.747 0.603   
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Cross Loadings 
  AUD BRB CPX FRN PEN PGS RTT TCC TNC TRP 
AUD2 0.744 -0.085 -0.200 0.564 -0.315 -0.167 0.244 -0.171 -0.390 -0.232 
AUD3 0.591 -0.192 -0.270 0.337 -0.279 -0.173 0.240 -0.290 -0.298 -0.367 
AUD4 0.823 -0.118 -0.372 0.656 -0.353 -0.219 0.382 -0.369 -0.497 -0.274 
BRB1 -0.241 0.853 0.234 -0.306 0.167 0.179 -0.317 0.202 0.207 0.271 
BRB2 -0.075 0.619 0.131 -0.116 0.186 0.128 -0.132 0.104 0.078 0.319 
BRB3 -0.074 0.654 0.151 -0.149 0.136 0.167 -0.171 0.115 0.086 0.213 
BRB4 -0.028 0.734 0.071 -0.070 -0.008 0.086 -0.051 0.110 0.148 0.275 
CPX1 -0.316 0.190 0.745 -0.359 0.446 0.291 -0.687 0.338 0.305 0.377 
CPX2 -0.304 0.131 0.810 -0.293 0.467 0.206 -0.671 0.268 0.350 0.161 
CPX3 -0.253 0.159 0.673 -0.240 0.357 0.123 -0.418 0.170 0.222 0.179 
FRN1 0.600 -0.230 -0.280 0.792 -0.402 -0.158 0.316 -0.304 -0.452 -0.292 
FRN2 0.570 -0.119 -0.307 0.828 -0.340 -0.219 0.405 -0.213 -0.521 -0.276 
FRN3 0.600 -0.253 -0.381 0.766 -0.393 -0.149 0.394 -0.336 -0.421 -0.334 
PEN1 -0.439 0.114 0.492 -0.437 0.859 0.290 -0.564 0.271 0.480 0.466 
PEN3 -0.279 0.133 0.369 -0.295 0.707 0.285 -0.387 0.246 0.254 0.173 
PEN4 -0.184 0.106 0.407 -0.279 0.642 0.191 -0.429 0.128 0.247 0.105 
PGS1 -0.183 0.180 0.184 -0.168 0.299 0.609 -0.242 0.220 0.236 0.204 
PGS2 -0.220 0.153 0.291 -0.184 0.283 0.738 -0.333 0.201 0.260 0.339 
PGS3 -0.161 0.047 0.109 -0.135 0.131 0.820 -0.155 0.157 0.115 0.195 
RTT1 0.317 -0.264 -0.357 0.395 -0.447 -0.273 0.771 -0.277 -0.444 -0.364 
RTT2 0.277 -0.151 -0.694 0.341 -0.434 -0.279 0.690 -0.325 -0.303 -0.389 
RTT3 0.289 -0.109 -0.799 0.270 -0.500 -0.211 0.706 -0.282 -0.355 -0.169 
TCC -0.384 0.195 0.356 -0.351 0.299 0.265 -0.401 1.000 0.226 0.354 
TNC1 0.371 0.139 0.302 -0.434 0.401 0.236 -0.420 0.178 0.852 0.352 
TNC2 0.527 0.209 0.356 -0.557 0.428 0.271 -0.441 0.183 0.839 0.455 
TNC3 0.466 0.166 0.346 -0.467 0.379 0.205 -0.469 0.242 0.791 0.240 
TNC4 0.462 0.139 0.314 -0.466 0.352 0.261 -0.377 0.143 0.820 0.319 
TRP1 -0.252 0.364 0.183 -0.233 0.264 0.223 -0.238 0.260 0.234 0.640 
TRP2 -0.380 0.333 0.312 -0.375 0.317 0.329 -0.400 0.315 0.416 0.859 
TRP3 -0.236 0.150 0.224 -0.232 0.335 0.230 -0.318 0.245 0.289 0.814 
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Path Coefficients (Mean, STDEV, T-Values) 
  
Original 
Sample (O) 
Sample 
Mean 
(M) 
Std. Dev 
(STDEV) 
Std. Error 
(STERR) 
T Stat 
(|O/STERR|) 
P Values 
AUD -> TNC -0.228 -0.233 0.072 0.072 3.148 0.001 
BRB -> TNC -0.004 0.007 0.046 0.046 0.089 0.460 
CPX -> TNC 0.091 0.105 0.074 0.074 1.487 0.069 
FRN -> TNC -0.260 -0.256 0.073 0.073 3.540 0.000 
PEN -> TNC 0.083 0.084 0.058 0.058 1.426 0.075 
PGS -> TNC 0.061 0.064 0.049 0.049 1.252 0.175 
RTT -> TNC -0.318 -0.313 0.090 0.090 3.551 0.000 
TCC -> TNC -0.126 -0.128 0.048 0.048 2.621 0.004 
TRP -> TNC 0.129 0.127 0.053 0.053 2.433 0.009 
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Measurement Model of The Direct Relationships 
 
Measurement Model Before Deletion of Low Loadings 
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Measurement Model of The Mediated Relationships 
